

UNCLASSIFIED

2


TOTAL ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE FOR 2010

by

DONALD C. BREWER, JR.

Major, AV, Missouri Army National Guard

AD-A227 602



THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

March 1990

THE VIEWS CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR, AND PUBLICATION OF THIS RESEARCH BY THE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROGRAM, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ENDORSEMENT THEREOF BY THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OR ANY OTHER BRANCH OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS NONE		
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3 DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY OF REPORT UNLIMITED		
2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION ADVANCED RESEARCH PROGRAM		6b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, RI 02841-5010			7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) "TOTAL ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE FOR 2010"					
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Major Donald C. Brewer, Jr., AV, Missouri Army National Guard					
13a TYPE OF REPORT Final		13b TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) March 1990	
15 PAGE COUNT 68					
16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17 COSATI CODES			18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Force Structure, Total Army, Baseline 2010, Reserve Components		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This paper attempts to design a force structure for the Total Army for the 2010 time period. It is always important to be assessing the future and planning accordingly, but it seems urgent now considering the nature and rapidity of global events. The development of the Total Army concept is reviewed, followed by an examination of alternative futures for 2010, and finally a force structure for the Total Army is proposed. I review the U.S. National Security Strategy in order to best design the force structure to meet the needs of that strategy. To do so, I recommend a smaller active force that is more robust with the most modern, high-tech weaponry available. These forces will be mostly balanced with their contingent CS and CSS units to respond to immediate crises anywhere in the world, according to our security interests. The reserve component should be composed of the heavier forces, although a portion of the heavy forces with 50% of their support forces will be kept in the active forces. The short warning scenario threat will probably go almost entirely away. Therefore, the RC will have more time after mobilization to attain full combat capability. However, we must not be lulled into letting down our guard, training and readiness must					
20 DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Professor Hattendorf, Dir, ARP			22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 401-841-2101		22c OFFICE SYMBOL 35

Block 19.

continue to be strongly emphasized. The evolution can logically take place through the transition to AirLand Battle - Future.

ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to design a force structure for the Total Army for the 2010 time period. It is always important to be assessing the future and planning accordingly, but it seems urgent now considering the nature and rapidity of global events. The development of the Total Army concept is reviewed, followed by an examination of alternative futures for 2010, and finally a force structure for the Total Army is proposed. I review the U.S. National Security Strategy in order to best design the force structure to meet the needs of that strategy. To do so, I recommend a smaller active force that is more robust with the most modern, high-tech weaponry available. These forces will be mostly balanced with their ^{combat support} ~~CS~~ and ^{combat service support} ~~CSS~~ units to respond to immediate crises any where in the world, ^(RC) according to our security interests. The reserve component ^Λ should be composed of the heavier forces, although a portion of the heavy forces with 50% of their support forces will be kept in the active forces. The short warning scenario threat will probably go almost entirely away. Therefore, the RC will have more time after mobilization to attain full combat capability. However, we must not be lulled into letting down our guard, training and readiness must continue to be strongly emphasized. The evolution can logically take place through the transition to AirLand Battle - Future.



Accession For	
DTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

PREFACE

Much of my research came from keeping abreast of current events. This helped update the long-range planning products which I reviewed. I am very much appreciative of the time extended to me by those who returned my questionnaire. Staff and faculty of the Naval War College who were especially helpful include the Army Fellows, COL Harry Rothman and LTC(P) Jack Hammond; the Senior Army Advisor, COL Duane Barber; and my faculty advisors. I also want to thank the entire Office of Plans, Analysis, and Evaluation under the leadership of COL Morris Wood at the National Guard Bureau.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
PREFACE	iii
I INTRODUCTION	1
II DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL ARMY	3
Reserve Components	3
World Situation	6
Reserve Forces as Part of the Total Army	8
Forward Deployed Forces	10
III LONG-RANGE PLANNING	12
Long-Range Planning	13
Trends	14
Planning Assumptions	14
Alternative Futures	15
Baseline 2010	15
Stable Coalitions with Deep Reductions	17
End of NATO and WP	19
Reversal of Soviet Reform	20
IV FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE ARMY OF 2010	22
National Interests	22
National Security Strategy	23
Role of the Army	24
Planning Assumptions	25
Similarities within Alternative Futures	26
Considerations for the Landforce of 2010	26
Force Structure of the Total Army	29
Concept	34
Implications	35
V CONCLUSIONS	37
Problems Uncovered	37
Conclusions	37
Recommendations	38
Conclusion	39

APPENDIX I	41
APPENDIX II	52
NOTES	54
BIBLIOGRAPHY	57

THE TOTAL ARMY FOR THE NEXT CENTURY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Problem. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney set the planning agenda for cuts of up to \$180 billion through FY 94. LTG Herbert Temple, Jr. (Ret.), then Chief of the National Guard Bureau said in Hershey, PA at the NGB Army Resource Management Conference, "Our national strength is being driven by the dollar."¹ Add to the fiscal constraints the vast political changes in Eastern Europe and Russia and you have reinforced the impetus for the cuts. But the question has been asked by many, Are the reductions being planned with sound strategy as a backing or is each individual service merely protecting its own interests? Therefore, the purpose of my research was to determine the force structure of the reserve components of the U.S. Army that would best satisfy the needs of the security environment of the year 2010. I began the research under the following assumptions:

1. Budgetary constraints will continue to force a reduction in Active Army personnel strength,
2. Forward deployed forces in Europe will be reduced by Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations and a reduced threat of a short warning attack by the Warsaw Pact against Western Europe,
3. Indicators and warning will increase the time to prepare for major conflict in Europe, and
4. The Total Army Concept will continue to be the Dept. of the Army policy.

Task. I set out to investigate possible security environments twenty years into the future in order to determine the force structure needed to meet U.S. National Security Strategy. Since my primary focus deals with the future of the reserve component (RC) of the Total Army, I first had to define the structure of the Total Army. I found that with the limited time available for my research, most of it was consumed with determining the future environments. I have included much of the information collected in that area in Appendix I: a synopsis of the long-range planning of the services. I divided my research, and thus my paper, into three major sections: the development of the Total Army Policy, the future security environment, and the Total Army force structure for 2010.

Scope. In an attempt to be as unbiased as possible, I interviewed key individuals in various planning roles in the Active Army, the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and appropriate Department of Defense staffs. Additionally, I surveyed several retired generals and lieutenants general with a questionnaire, the results of which are summarized in Appendix II.

Terms. Within the context of this paper, the term "reserve component" includes both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. "Total Army" and "Army" are used synonymously and include the active component (AC) and the reserve component (RC).

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL ARMY

In August of 1970, then Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, proposed the Total Force Concept. As the name implies, it included active and reserve forces in "the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat."¹ 1973 marked the beginning of the Total Army. Today the active component of the Army has an end strength less than that of 1973, and yet has five more divisions. Within ever present budget constraints, the Army designed its force to best meet the worst case scenario against U.S. national interests: a Warsaw Pact attack into Central Europe with minimal warning. It was believed that all lesser threats could be successfully dealt with by being ready for the worst. To increase the number of divisions and decrease personnel, the Reserve Component (RC) increased its responsibilities and became an integral requirement for the successful execution of U.S. military strategy. In fact, many RC units were expected to deploy with AC units and others just a few days behind. For a better understanding of the Total Army, I will review its development within the national and international environment.

Reserve Components. During the Vietnam era, the RC did not fill the role that it had up to the time of the Korean War. Up to that time it was the strategic reserve to be called upon to reinforce the active component (AC) in times of national need. Conscripts filled the needed personnel shortage for the AC during Vietnam. After the Vietnam War the AC no longer needed the excess strength and so was reduced to pre-Korean War size of 13 divisions with a total strength of 800,000. However, the Army felt it needed more combat divisions

to counter the threat in the worst case scenario, so the administration agreed to increase the number of divisions to 16. However, This would be done without increasing personnel. Therefore as the AC increased the number of divisions, the RC was called on to fill the gap with "roundout" brigades and battalions. In other words, some active divisions were not complete. A certain portion of the division was actually part of the RC. Additionally in order to keep as much combat power in the AC as possible, much of the combat support and combat service support forces were transferred to the RC. Thus, in the event hostilities broke out the support units were expected to mobilize and deploy within a few days. The plan called for the roundout units to deploy with their AC divisions. This expectation demanded an unprecedented readiness on the part of RC units. Now, not only was the esteem of the reserves which had been damaged during the Vietnam era being restored, but they were elevated to a position of responsibility which had previously never been extended to them. However, as this relationship evolved, the funding required to produce the expected readiness was slow in coming.

Binkin and Kaufman point out in their book, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, that the decision makers did not formulate these plans for totally strategic reasons. They maintain that the greater reliance upon the reserves resulted from somewhat unrelated piecemeal decisions. Factors affecting the process included lower manpower availability after ending the draft, the Total Force Concept as described above, the compelling need to keep more combat power in the shrinking active component, the lower cost of a reserve unit, the political influence of the lawmakers, and a way to prevent the President from entangling the country in another Vietnam without public support.² The

latter was probably the overriding reason for the development of the Total Army Policy. The mobilization of the reserves necessarily brings with it the resolve of the American People. The disruption in their lives that such an act causes would not be tolerated without good cause. The President and Congress should certainly recognize and evaluate the seriousness of the situation before mobilizing any reserve forces. This would prevent the Army from receiving the brunt of public dissatisfaction as it had during the Vietnam Conflict.

Throughout the military rebuilding of the eighties, the reserves assumed even greater responsibility. Not only did the various contingency plans require almost immediate deployment of the support units, but now some of the roundout units were expected to deploy to Europe within ten days of mobilization. The U.S. agreement to provide ten divisions in ten days necessitated the use of RC forces. Along with the increased responsibility came more of the funding and equipment needed to support the readiness of the reserves. Nevertheless, shortcomings still existed. The 1988 GAO report to Congress concerning the Reserve Components noted that in 1987 "25 % of reserve component units required additional resources or training to perform their wartime mission due to personnel shortages, lack of skills required for duty positions, and equipment shortages."³ The increased responsibility came in much the same manner as noted above--piecemeal. The GAO report also pointed out that "DOD has not provided guidance for deciding what portions of the force--force mix--will be in the active and reserve components and what missions the reservists should perform within that mix."⁴ Such a report is to be forthcoming in September of 1990.

Prior to WW II the National Guard and the Reserve held a place of honor in the defense of our country. The standing, or active, Army was traditionally kept small. In the event of

a national emergency, the reserve components would be mobilized and subsequently trained and equipped to meet the need. The National Guard was, in fact, the only reserve component prior to WW I. Then, as now, the states relied upon the Guard to respond to crises in the respective states. Thus, the long standing tradition of defending its country has belonged to the National Guard since the Revolutionary War. The Army Reserve joined in that tradition beginning with WW I.

Following WW II the reserve components contributed to protecting the U.S. security interests in Korea, Berlin, and during the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, as noted above, during Vietnam President Johnson chose to use conscription rather than activate the reserves. As a result the Army reserve components found themselves with a very low priority and experienced a degrading effect in equipment and training. Thus the period after 1973 became one of rebuilding and resurgence for the Army reserve components. Even with the shortfalls in readiness to meet many wartime missions, the RCs are better equipped and trained today than at any time in their history. "USAR and ARNG combat units, particularly at battalion and brigade level generally are well trained, have low turnover of personnel, and are able to achieve reasonably high levels of readiness. This is highlighted by scheduled participation at the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Chaffee, and by overseas exercises such as Team spirit and Reforger."⁵

World Situation. The Warsaw Pact threat and the Soviet aggressive world posture in part dictated the shape of today's Total Army. The view that the Warsaw Pact could launch an attack on Western Europe with very little warning demanded that our forces be ready to rapidly deploy to reinforce our troops already forward deployed in Europe. The composition

of our forces in Europe evolved in large part in response to the Soviet threat during the period since WW II called the Cold War. Among the men who led Russia during this time, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev have played predominate roles. In understanding the changes in our European defense posture, it is worthwhile to trace some of the events and views of the periods of each of these men.

Stalin set the tone for Russian foreign policy after WW II. He believed occupation provided the best means to influence an area or country. Under his leadership over 300,000 Soviet troops were stationed in East Germany. He discounted the value of the atomic bomb, yet continued to strive for the capability. Russian influence spread during his tenure through armed aggression and exportation of military hardware and expertise.

Leadership passed to Khrushchev in 1955 and he led until 1964. Several key events mark his tenure: nuclearization of Europe, the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the pounding of his shoe in a U.N. meeting boasting that Russia would bury the United States, and continued buildup of Soviet troops and military spending. The Cold War threatened to become hot on several occasions during this time. The U.S. showed its resolve by increasing its nuclear capability and with a show of force during the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Under Brezhnev's control, Soviet military capability continued to increase significantly. All areas improved with significant emphasis given to chemical and nuclear warfare. He increased the military manpower from 3.4 million to 4.4 million. Though we fought Vietnamese, the Soviet Union was seen as the force behind the spread of Communism. Limiting the influence of the Communists in Vietnam meant limiting the influence of Russia.


Then following Vietnam, our active forces were reduced, but Russian capabilities continued to improve. Thus, if we were to contain Russian Communism, our capabilities had to keep pace with theirs. Therefore, modernization of the military began under the Reagan administration. Though our active military strength decreased (2.7 to 2.0 million), overall capability improved through the combined effect of active and reserve forces. The RC capability, as noted in the previous section, vastly improved and the RCs assumed greater responsibility in meeting the needs of our national security.

1985 ushered in the present era of leadership under Gorbachev. The rhetoric emanating from Moscow changed significantly, but our fears remained and modernization continued even though defense spending flattened. However, in the last year, events throughout Eastern Europe have reinforced the new rhetoric. Now the Soviet Union appears to be almost alone in the Warsaw Pact. The political atmosphere is bringing about changes so rapidly that an initial lack of response on the part of the U.S. administration has drawn criticism from congressional leaders and citizenry alike. The debate centers on the size of our forward deployed forces in Europe based upon the apparent reduction in the threat from Eastern Europe. Should these forces be reduced, and if so, how much? This leads us to the question, how should our forces be shaped for the future?

Reserve Forces as Part of the Total Army. The United States Army today evolved as a result of all the forces and events outlined above. A total of 28 divisions compose its combat force. Eighteen divisions are active and 10 are in the reserve components. The reserve components comprise 52% of this Total Army. Forty-four percent of the Army's combat strength comes from the Army National Guard (ARNG) and eight percent from the

US Army Reserve (USAR). Additionally, six of the 18 active divisions are rounded out by an RC brigade. The increase from 16 to 18 divisions resulted from the forming of two light divisions. This was done again without increasing end strength. Therefore, more responsibility was shifted to the RC. As a result, we have an almost total reliance of the AC on the RC for support in a sustained operation. Of the Army's combat support and combat service support 40% is in the USAR and 27% in the ARNG (See TABLE I).

TABLE I



From Forces/Capabilities Handbook: Organizations.

Volume 1, p. 2-31.

Forward Deployed Forces. Part of the U.S. containment objective has been to forward-deploy forces in various parts of the world. The two predominant locations are Western Europe and Korea. At the time of this writing the U.S. maintains one infantry division in Korea. Two armored and two mechanized divisions are in Europe to support NATO. The support for the combat forces needed in Europe is to be provided by the hostnation until our CS and CSS forces arrive after mobilization. With this force mix we have maintained mostly combat force in Europe to counter the short warning Warsaw Pact threat. If we had maintained the CS and CSS units in Europe as well, we would have had less than 50% of the combat forces there that we have at this time. As a result the active component remains dependant on the reserve component to sustain combat.

Forward deployment enables us to meet a potential foe who was perceived to be able to attack Western Europe with very little warning. However, with events of the past year, military analysts now maintain that the Soviet Union would not have the support of its Eastern European allies if they were to launch an attack. Now the foe has become less threatening by promising to withdraw most of the Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. Thus, the need for forward-deployed forces is waning. As noted before, the indicators and warning would allow us more time to prepare for potential hostilities in Europe.

The situation in Korea also holds potential for reducing our forces there. Republic of Korean forces are better able to defend against the threat from North Korea than they have been in the past. It is projected that by 1991, South Korean forces will be at a parity with those of the North. Therefore, 5,000 U.S. troops may be withdrawn from this area before the end of FY 90.

For all of these reasons, our military planners and strategists are currently reassessing the threat, and along with it, the future needs of our national security. Before planning the future force structure, one must predict future needs, threats, and resources. These issues will be addressed in the following chapter dealing with long-range planning and alternative futures.

CHAPTER III

LONG-RANGE PLANNING

Think in anticipation, today for tomorrow, and indeed, for many days. The greatest providence is to have forethought for what comes. What is provided for does not happen by chance, nor is the man who is prepared ever beset by emergencies. One must not, therefore, postpone consideration till the need arises. Consideration should go beforehand.¹

Baltasar Jeronimo Graciban y Morales

For several reasons the United States has traditionally been poor at long-range planning. Predicting future needs, threats, and resources is a task that requires additional attention by the agencies of our government. The very nature of our democratic process exacerbates the problem. For example: the task of our lawmakers is to lead the nation; lawmaker longevity improves establishment continuity; longevity begins at the poles; therefore, elected officials have a propensity to make decisions that will get them reelected. Likewise, the president can easily be prejudiced to make decisions that will gain him a second term. His popularity and reputation depend on what he does for the current situations not on those of the distant future. This relative shortness lends itself to shortsightedness. The ultimate goal is staying in office, rather than the long-range good of the nation. Because of the uncertainty of the distant future, many people do not look beyond a few years, and others perhaps only months, while still others can only see today. In this chapter I will explore the possible security environments the United States will face in the year 2010. In doing so, I will review several different alternative futures used in long-range planning by the services. Other alternative

Other alternative futures and a review of the various approaches to long-range planning by the military services are contained in Appendix I.

Two methods dominate long-range planning. The best indications we have for the future lie in the trends developing from the past to the present. Therefore, both methods study trends in an effort to project what the future may present. After projecting trends into the future, planners look back from a future date and write history as they perceive it might happen. The second method is to write alternative futures. This method takes into account possible branches or routes the trends may take based upon actions, or decisions, of key players. "The use of the alternative futures approach is both a sobering and a mindstretching exercise highly recommended for both long-range planners and decisionmakers."² Neither method is flawless, but can only give us a probable map of territory yet uncharted.

Several other factors contribute to the lack of long-range planning. Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.) identified determinism, threat to authority, and ideological bias against planning as detractors to the long-range planning process.³ Planners must strive to look past these inhibitors in order to preserve the United States not only as a superpower, but perhaps simply as a nation. Current world political conditions accentuate the need for such long-range planning. We must be in a position to make adjustments. "But the most difficult, and in some ways the most important adjustments will have to come in the ways in which, and the rate at which, we anticipate and understand the shifting circumstances in which we will surely find ourselves."⁴

Long-Range Planning. The military services begin long-range planning with guidance from the Department of Defense. The Defense Guidance and certain documents from the

Joint Strategic Planning System form the foundation for their long-range planning. Trends are identified before predicting the future. Both the writing of future history and the alternative futures methods aid their long-range planning. During the last four decades, planning focused on the Warsaw Pact, short warning threat. Circumstances today point to a changing threat for the future.

Trends. The following trends will shape the security environment for the planning the planning period.

1. Political changes in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. indicate the Soviet threat will decrease.
2. Emerging technology has the potential to change battlefield tactics and strategic deterrence.
3. Military capability will continue to increase throughout the world with developing countries acquiring greater conventional ability as well as chemical and biological weapons.
4. An increase in military weaponry will give rise to the increased use of that weaponry in the shape of regional conflict, terrorist acts, insurgent and anti-insurgent activities, and drug related violence.
5. U.S. defense budgets will continue to decline with the declining Soviet threat.
6. With the changing political and fiscal environment, alliances may face changes.

Planning Assumptions. Based upon these trends, I make the following assumptions for planning.

1. Budgetary constraints will continue to force a reduction in Active Army personnel strength and forward deployed forces around the world.

2. Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations will force additional reduction in forward deployed forces in Europe.
3. The Warsaw Pact threat against Western Europe will continue to decrease.
4. Improved technology will increase warning time prior to a major/heavy conflict.

Alternative Futures. Having identified the trends and establishing the planning assumptions, I now attempt to predict four possible security environments in which the United States may have to operate. To do so I examined many alternative futures proposed in the planning of the various services, as well as several written by private individuals and institutions (see Appendix I). The following four futures establish the environment for which I propose the force structure for the Army contained in Chapter IV. The first reflects my personal views incorporated with what I have read and studied. I believe it to be the most likely scenario, and thus title it "Baseline 2010". The following three best describe the alternative future environments suggested by a recent brief entitled "Alternative Futures and their Implications for the Army" prepared by the Arroyo Center for the Army. The futures specifically relate to Europe in the briefing; however, I expand them here to encompass a broader global scope. Arroyo entitles the scenarios; "Stable coalitions with deep reductions case," "End of NATO and the WP case," and "Reversal of Soviet reform case."⁵ The Arroyo Center did not expand beyond the titles, so I tie them here to alternative futures composed by others, as noted below.

Baseline 2010. The world is no longer characterized as bipolar but multipolar. Although most countries have improved their military or acquired one, the predominant struggle is economic. The key players in the multipolar world are the United States, the

Soviet Union, the European Community centered around a unified Germany, Japan and China. Cooperative economic ventures characterized the previous decade. Though all benefitted by it, the Soviet Union and China especially did because of their relative rise in economic conditions. These countries opened their doors to a more open market system while not totally leaving the socialist ways. The US and USSR influence in Europe, as well as in the rest of the world, has declined. Therefore, as smaller states come into conflict as they struggle for regional hegemony, the assumption that superpowers will not interfere gives rise to military action. Examples may include instances such as Iran and Iraq or India and Pakistan. These conflicts may occur at a regularity greater than at any time since WWII.

The U.S. continues to experience an economic growth trend following several periods of recession in the nineties. At one point the country's economic system nearly collapsed. Strides have been made toward cutting the huge debt but the US remains one of the largest debtor nations in the world. American politics have come "under increasing domestic criticism as lacking in vision."⁶

Militarily, the US has reduced the size of both the active and reserve components compared to 1990 levels. The mobility and lethality of the AC have been increased through technology. Laser and directed energy weapons are being appropriated. After a reduced emphasis on readiness of the RC because of increased warning time in the nineties, their ability to mobilize and meet mission needs declined. They are now being modernized because of the increase in regional conflict. The process is only partially complete. The United States developed and deployed a space based Strategic Defense System and an

improved land based Ballistic Missile Defense System. The U.S. military plays a greater role in drug interdiction operations than they did in the nineties.

The USSR focused more on its economic growth than its military in the last decade of the 20th Century. "Soviet strategic forces have decreased in quantity but increased in quality. The Soviet Union has developed a strategic defense system and improved its ballistic missile defense. High-technology weapons (lasers, directed energy weapons) are being phased into its conventional force."⁷

The military and economic power of Japan and China have increased. Japan is clearly an economic leader and has been cooperative with China in several ventures. This has caused concern with Russia who has strengthened its ties with India. The combination of these events has propelled China into a larger global participation in arms control and treaty negotiations.

The Middle East continues to be an area of importance because of the world's increased dependence on oil. Major countries of the area have modernized their military forces and some are believed to have acquired nuclear weapons. Israeli/Arab problems continue to destabilize the area. Israel has not relinquished control of Arab territories and continues to control Jerusalem. Israel has closer ties with the European Community for both economic and military reasons.

Stable Coalitions with Deep Reductions Case. Thomas H. Etzold's Snapshot 2010 in his paper, "Strategy in the 21st Century: Alternative Futures for Strategic Planning" best depicts this scenario.

In the year 2010, the world situation seemed at once at rest and in tension. For the better part of 30 years, the superpowers had been experimenting with a more cooper-

ative than competitive approach to world affairs. The major alliances had reoriented themselves, de-emphasizing military dimensions of their ties and turning increasingly into forums for concerting views on political and economic matters as well as security policy. Radical economic and political experimentation had occurred repeatedly in Eastern Europe, China, and some third countries. The new agenda anticipated as paramount for world affairs as early as the 1970's had finally come into its own, occupying fully as much--probably more--time and attention from international and multilateral bodies, as well as from the statesmen and opinion elites in individual countries. Although satisfactory responses to most new agenda items were still distant, if ever to be devised, there was little challenge to the urgency, legitimacy, and mutuality of these concerns.

Militarily, superpower forces had declined still further, and the expansion of third country forces had slowed, although the development of third country indigenous arms production capability and other infrastructure, such as technology acquisition, continued unabated. Superpower nuclear forces had reached the 50% reductions mark shortly after 2000, and these forces had continued to decline slowly as they became obsolescent or grew too expensive to maintain, even in the absence of negotiated agreement on how small these forces could or should eventually be. Soviet and American forward ground forces in continental Europe had been completely withdrawn by 2007, although small air elements with their infrastructure remained there, a continuing reminder of the problems these had posed in the second phase of Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) negotiations. The considerable capabilities of third country forces in general and regional hegemonies in particular, was encouraging both continued Soviet-American strategic cooperation and orientation of their "leaner, meaner forces" toward deterrence of crisis and suppression of conflict in the world's regions; the war for Europe had ceased to be the primary planning case for either the US or the USSR, with both increasingly concerned about the growing military power and its possible uses in India, China, the Koreas, the Middle East, Southern/South Africa, and parts of Central and South America. Yet continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and/or technology, as well as chemical warfare capabilities, clouded the future in terms of prospects for avoiding or containing warfare.

Economically, the year 2010 was a time for taking stock of the East's experiments, the West's attempts to revive lagging performance, and third country efforts to manage debt as well as generate growth and development. Stock-taking in itself promoted a sense of rest, of contemplation, but in the absence of conclusive results from most such efforts, there remained considerable potential for serious internal discord in a number of states, including the superpowers, their traditional allies. Renewed regional conflict likewise seemed a genuine possibility. The more mature economies--those of the US, Japan, the "Little Dragons" in Asia (less Hong Kong), and some in Western Europe--seemed poised for renewed if moderate growth, although much in that outlook depended on whether there would be enough in the way of stable industrialized countries and capability to permit "post-industrial" economies to flourish.

Politically this time of evaluation was also a time of impending change. The passing of leadership from one generation to another such as had occurred widely in the

1990's seemed likely to take place once again in the decade following 2010. The make-up, policies, and styles of new leaders would depend much on judgments made about the relative merits and promise of the previous decades' experiments in going from traditional communism and capitalism to hybrid or mixed economies perhaps better suited to reviving growth and stimulating radical and rapid, rather than incremental, development.

In sum, the world of 2010 held many incentives for continued and extended superpower cooperation, but concurrently it promised to pose more frequent and perhaps remain primarily cooperative in nature amid heightened stresses, many involving nontraditional issues, was far from clear. Nor was it clear, in view of the issues themselves and the levels of third country military capability and economic independence, that even cooperatively the superpowers could decisively influence the cause of coming events. Thus the possibility of renewed competition was less remote than it had been for some two decades or more. Similarly, depending on the conclusions reached concerning past experiments in economics and politics, it was difficult to foresee the amount and intensity of internal strife in third countries and the extent to which internal problems might seem resolvable through external conflict rather than internal and international cooperation. As in superpower relations, there seemed significant potential for return to a more competitive and violent rather than cooperative multilateral environment.⁸

End of NATO and WP Case. This case is best described by the Army National Guard Long-Range Planning Guidance (ARNG LRPG) Scenario Alpha, which was taken from Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning by Charles W. Taylor of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.

The United States has evolved as one of the leading postindustrial nations of the world. Congress and the administration have achieved more social and welfare oriented domestic programs than those related to national defense or foreign military aid. There has been a gradual rise in the national economy, and the employment rate is high. Competition for skilled manpower is quite keen.

The industrial base of a number of Third World nations has been expanding due to the relocation of heavy industries from the U.S., Europe and Japan, creating an increasingly competitive world economy. Many of these same Third World countries have been armed with conventional weapons and a few have invested in nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

The overall effect has been a rise in nationalism and independence which has resulted in the nationalization of foreign businesses in many countries, the ousting of foreign personnel and the closing of military bases in selected countries and the reversal of long-term military and political agreements.

Western Europeans have been disillusioned by the United States' apparent waning interest in and commitments to NATO (65% reduction of forward deployed troops since 1988) and the continued U.S./Soviet nuclear weapons reductions and have turned their attention toward fostering East European participation in the European common market rather than maintaining and strengthening their warfighting capabilities.

The Soviet Union has increased its efforts to improve internal domestic development. Although still a significant military power, the Soviet Union has become more interested in economic adventures than military ones. The U.S. defense strategy is characterized as isolationist and the U.S. and the Soviet Union have again increased reliance on the nuclear deterrent. Because of this strategic orientation, the U.S. Navy and the Air Force have fared well in a time of declining budgets but the Active Army forces have been reduced by almost half. However, they have become fully modernized and have become highly mobile. The trend has been toward 'force packages' characterized by high technology and high mobility. The reserve component land forces have remained at 1988 structure levels and have become primarily heavy forces with a mix of high technology, 1990's modernized equipment and almost obsolete "previous generation" equipment from the eighties.⁹

Reversal of Soviet Reform Case. The following scenario is taken from Scenario

Bravo 2008 of the ARNG Long-Range Planning Guidance.

. . . heavy industries have been transferred to Third World countries. High technology has replaced them and led to an improved economic scene as well as a higher quality of life for the general public in the U.S. Many of these Third World states have matured to modern industrial statehood because of the presence of US economic and military influences. The increased economic competition in the world has created real or perceived fears on the part of many of these newly industrialized nations and they have become heavily armed with conventional weapons. There has also been a slight increase in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Although the Soviet Union has continued to improve its internal economy, it also has increased its expenditures in weapons programs and military space activities. The Soviet conventional threat, its remaining nuclear capabilities and its military achievements in space are perceived as a formidable threat to the US and the rest of the free world.

In 2010 the US defense posture is highly capable of reacting to any threat across the spectrum of conflict. The strategy relies less on a nuclear deterrent and more on conventional forces under a strategic space umbrella. The US is prepared to become more heavily involved in all facets of international activity than ever before in its history. The Active Army is manned at between 800 and 900 thousand troops and the Reserve Component Landforces number between 1.2 and 1.4 million troops.¹⁰

Add to this scenario a USSR that moved into Eastern Europe after a change of leadership. Recreating the buffer zone is their objective and no obstacle seems to deter these intentions. This would create a very dangerous situation.

Conclusion. As certain as the future is uncertain, what we will face in the future will not lie in only one of the above alternative futures. Nor do these futures allow for every possible event or combination thereof. But we "must not . . . postpone consideration until the need arises," for we will then surely be "beset by emergencies."¹¹

With change a constant part of the present, long-range planning considers the trends and possible future environments to propose a force structure that will meet our national security needs. This I will do in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE ARMY OF 2010

"By making it universally reputable to bear Arms and disgraceful to decline having a share in the performance of Military duties, by keeping up in Peace a well regulated and disciplined Militia, we shall take the fairest and best method to preserve for a long time to come, the happiness, dignity and independence of our Country."

George Washington

Chapter II reviewed the Reserve Component role in the Total Army and showed the heavy reliance of the Total Army on the Reserves. After looking into the future in Chapter III, it must now be determined what the Total Army force structure ought to be. The force structure should be based upon U.S. National Security Strategy which is formulated to protect National Interests. Therefore, I will review our National Interests followed by our National Security Strategy. Then the commonalities of the alternative futures from Chapter III will be listed. I will restate my planning assumptions and finally discuss the force structure of the Army and how it meets the needs of the proposed security environment of the year 2010.

National Interests. The following interests imply a global scope. The interests necessitate a national strategy that extends beyond the Eurasian landmass to the entire world and even to regions of space which can be used to influence activities on the earth.

1. "The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to provide opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for our national endeavors.

3. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests.
4. The growth of human freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system.
5. Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships."¹

National Security Strategy. Since WWII the U.S. objective has been containment: to "prevent the Soviet Union from dominating those great concentrations of industrial power and human capacity that are in Western Europe and East Asia."² The threat of communist expansion dominated the arena of political concern. It also drove the military buildup of the eighties.

To protect our interests and achieve our objective, U.S. national security strategy became flexible response and deterrence. This means we portray the ability to respond while we avoid revealing the true nature and magnitude of the response. Deterrence is the building and maintaining of such a military force that any potential adversary would realize that the cost of aggression would be greater than the gain he sought, and under no circumstances would he achieve his objective.

Militarily, containment was achieved by both building a large strategic nuclear capability and more recently, a strong conventional force. Forward deployment of our forces and having a reserve force ready for rapid reinforcement has provided both deterrence and flexibility. This strategy, coupled with our interests, allows for a broad interpretation and application. Though our goal was to contain Russian Communism within its borders, our interests extended the strategy to a global scale. Therefore, the United States attempted to

thwart any influence or activity of Soviet Communism beyond its established limits. The role of the Total Army since 1973 has contributed to the success of our strategy

Role of the Army. The role of the Total Army must be understood within the context of our national security strategy. Title 10, United States Code records the mission of the U.S. Army as:

1. Preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
2. Supporting the national policies;
3. Implementing the national objectives; and
4. Overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

The Army strategic roles are as follows:

1. Provide forward-deployed ground forces for deterrence, sustained land combat, and conflict termination in areas of vital interest,
2. Maintain combat-ready ground forces--heavy, light, and special operations--in CONUS for immediate contingencies worldwide,
3. Maintain forces in CONUS able to reinforce forward-deployed and contingency forces,
4. Participate in disaster relief, emergency assistance, and interdiction of illicit drug traffic, and
5. Provide support to allied and friendly nations through peacekeeping, security assistance, and army-to-army initiatives.

To accomplish this, "the Army organizes, trains, and equips land forces, but they are actually employed by Unified and Specified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) located throughout the world."³ CINCs assess the threat within their area of responsibility and formulate plans to counter the threat.* The CINCs then forward the plans and their "want list" of forces needed to execute the plans, should that become necessary, to the Secretary of Defense via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The force structure is limited, however, by the funds appropriated by Congress. Thus, forces are not manned and equipped at levels desired by the CINCs. At this point risks are assessed, plans adjusted, and the forces (both active and reserve) apportioned for planning accordingly. Army reserve component forces are an integral part of the CINC's operational emergency plans. Currently major "warfighting contingency plans cannot be successfully executed without the reserve components."⁴

Planning Assumptions. I base my planning on the following assumptions. They are made based upon current trends and events which I explored in the development of the alternative futures in Chapter III.

1. Budgetary constraints will continue to force a reduction in AC personnel strength.

* I have stressed the Soviet threat as if it has been our only threat. Other significant threats include terrorism, regional third world conflict, and drug interdiction. The predominant emphasis, however, has been on the Warsaw Pact and the proliferation of its ideology in other parts of the world. The Rand Corporation identified an unwritten organizational vision of the Army: "the instantly ready armored defender of Central Europe." [John Setear et al., The Army in a changing world: The Role of Organizational Vision, WD-4480-A (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1989), p. vii.] For this reason the Army is going through an identity crisis in light of the changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

2. Army forces in Europe will be reduced by CFE agreements and/or unilateral action.
3. The Warsaw Pact threat of a short warning attack against Western Europe will continue to decrease.
4. Political and physical conditions allow more time to prepare for a heavy war.
5. The Total Force Policy will continue to be stressed by Congress as a viable policy.

Similarities within Alternative Futures.

1. The technological base of the United States will either keep pace with or exceed that of the rest of the world.
2. Many third world countries will improve their economies through transfer of heavy industry from industrialized nations.
3. Many third world countries will acquire or improve their conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. Some will have a nuclear capability.
4. The world economy will become more interdependent.
5. The world political situation will become more multipolar than bipolar.
6. Countries such as China, Japan, India, Brazil, and Germany will play a larger role in world economic, political and military decisions.

Considerations for the Landforce of 2010. Now, considering the conditions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, does the Warsaw Pact and Communism pose as great a threat as it has over the last forty years? And for purposes of planning, what will the threat be in the year 2010? The answer to the first question is being debated in our newspapers

daily. The second question cannot be answered definitively, but with interests and objectives identified, a valid strategy can be developed.

Almost a decade ago Christopher Lee noted in his book about military balance that, "Capabilities are slow to change, but intentions, normally set in dogma and ambition, can alter within twenty-four hours."⁵ This resounded loud and clear in the Warsaw Pact in 1989 as the Soviet Union allowed Eastern Europe to slip from Communist control. However, intentions come and go with leadership and the duration of Mr. Gorbachev's leadership is unknown. Nevertheless, with the unlikely case of no improvement, the Soviet Union will remain one of the most capable foes facing the interests of the U.S. in 2010. This will be the case even without the help of the Eastern European Block countries.

While the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have been our primary threat for the last forty years, no single threat dominates the U.S. security environment of 2010. The alliance climate may require, as Thomas Etzold stated, "the ability to operate with various temporary partners in coalitions formed to deal with specific contingencies or issues at particular moments--much like a pick-up basketball game at the YMCA on Saturday morning. . ."⁶ Though I do not think it will change so quickly or with fluidity, the U.S. will have to respond to threats in a global arena, primarily from third world countries. These countries could pose a very capable threat at various levels of conflict, from light to highly modern armored land forces. Some will have a nuclear capability.

Therefore, the Army must be able to meet any threat across the spectrum of conflict. However, this does not mean the Army must plan to have the capability to meet the worst

case scenario upon very short warning. So, the question must be answered, who and where is the threat? I believe this can best be answered by first looking at who are our allies.

The major alliances of the latter years of the 20th Century will remain viable, though perhaps not in the same mode or intensity. The U.S. will maintain ties with Europe (broadened to include countries in Eastern Europe), Japan, Republic of Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Pakistan and other smaller countries with democratically elected governments. This list is not inclusive, however. Omissions do not mean that I think ties will not be maintained with certain other countries, but only that I am not providing an all-inclusive list.

Countries that may prove to be adversaries include the USSR, Syria, Cuba, Libya, Ethiopia, Iran, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and those governments considered unstable, illegitimate, and/or repressive. Certain major governments omitted can be viewed as falling into either list depending on the circumstances. They do not have repressive or illegitimate governments, but have the potential to be antagonistic to the interests of the United States. This category includes such countries as India, China, Brazil and perhaps even Mexico.

The primary threats, however, will be terrorism and insurgent or coup-type activities against governments and groups friendly to the U.S. and its interests. Thus, threats on the lower end of the spectrum of magnitude are highly probable. These will be immediate-type crises in which we will participate by invitation from legal authority. Obviously, forces needed to meet this threat do not equate to those needed to meet a Soviet advance across Central Europe. Therefore, the Army must have rapidly deployable units with full support

capability to defeat the more probable threat, as well as maintain forces to counter the less likely but higher consequential threat if necessary.

Force Structure of the Total Army. The Bush Administration called for the U.S. to move "beyond containment," which she has done. Thomas Etzold calls the objective, "strategic stability."⁷ The strategy still calls for deterrence and flexible response. Our strategic nuclear capability plays a major role in deterrence, and coalition warfare is the choice rather than opting to fight all battles (whether they be economic, political, or military) alone. Our global strategy includes forward deployment to show U.S. resolve, but the Army's role in it will be diminished in comparison to 1990 levels. Maritime forces dominate this area of our national strategy.

To meet the Total Army's role in the national strategic interests of 2010, I have opted for five Corps (four active and one reserve) and 22 divisions (10 active and 12 reserve--see Table I). The active component will have an end strength of 500,000, and the reserve component will have an end strength of 700,000.* The AC role will be to respond to immediate, short-term crises. The RC will train for the heavy, less likely war and will reinforce the AC in conflicts requiring a larger force to control and terminate the conflict under terms favorable to the United States. The decisions leading to this force structure resulted from a number of strategic trade-offs: forward deployment vs. central reserve, large active forces vs. ready reserve forces, heavy vs. light forces, and consistent security assis-

* This reflects the Selected Reserve category. The total manpower available for mobilization would also include approximately 280,000 soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve and another 260,000 retirees.

tance vs. sporadic crisis management. Along with these trade-offs, the longer time available for mobilization was a major factor in the decision process.

First, I see a combination of forward deployed forces and a central reserve being the best choice. While the Warsaw Pact threat has diminished, we need to continue to show our commitment to NATO. Therefore, one heavy corps headquarters and one heavy division will be maintained in Europe. The role of these troops (maximum of 50,000) is to promote stability and continuance of the military aspect of NATO and to maintain the pre-positioning

TABLE I
FORCE STRUCTURE

Type Corp	Active Component		Reserve Component	
	Corps	Divisions	Corps	Divisions
Europe	1	Hvy Armor Mech Inftry	0	0
Pacific	1	Mech Inftry Mech Inftry	0	0
Contingency	1	Airborne Lt Armor Air Asslt	0	0
Reinforcing	1	Hvy Armor Lt Armor Mech Inftry	1	5 Hvy Arm 6 Mch Inf 1 Air Aslt

of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS) at levels set by CFE agreements of the nineties. The corps HQ would be minimal, primarily responsible for planning and NATO liaison. The military aspect of NATO will diminish in importance. Therefore, our presence will serve to insure other members maintain at least a minimal degree of readiness. The AC/RC mix of this corps will remain as it was through the eighties.

Another Corps and two divisions are deployed in the Pacific region (Japan, S.Korea, Hawaii, and Alaska). This area has become a major arena for economic competition. The presence of the Army forces along with our Naval forces enhances regional stability. Fifty percent of the support units of the Pacific corps will be retained in the RC. The other 50% is considered minimal for any sustainment operations in that region.

The remainder of the AC (two corps and 7 divisions) will be maintained in the continental United States (CONUS) as a central reserve. This includes the remainder of the European corps and one mechanized division. They will provide conventional deterrence and a flexible response to global crises. The size of the force is adequate to respond to two, perhaps three, smaller regional crises simultaneously, or one larger conflict, without mobilizing the RC or depleting certain support forces from the rest of the AC. This can be accomplished by balancing the AC Contingency Corps with its full compliment of CS and CSS units. GEN Alexander Haig, USA(Ret.) says, "We need continued balance, heavy/light, with adequate tooth-to-tail; not a repeat of pre-Vietnam gimmickry (then Special Forces - now light, low intensity Army, CONUS based)."⁸ Theater support forces would remain in the RC. Strategic lift aircraft would be a limiting factor to the number of simultaneous conflicts.

The second choice, between maintaining a large active army or a ready reserve, required consideration of not only the threat but also the financial obligation. Since the catastrophic scenario should not occur without ample warning, a ready reserve force could maintain the required readiness to meet this threat. This decision was reinforced by the fact that large, heavy armored forces are very expensive to maintain. Likewise, a much smaller, lighter force could deploy rapidly to crisis areas by airlift or rapid sealift depending on the conditions. Since this is the type of threat that we are most likely to face in this era, the strategy calls for a smaller, lighter active force with a larger, heavier reserve force.

The third trade-off was inherently considered along with the second. The threat, warning times, and financial matters influenced the decisions in both areas. With the assumption that indicators would allow more warning time, the reserve component could accept increased mission responsibility for the Central European scenario. However, two heavy divisions (one in Europe and one in the Reinforcing Corps in CONUS) would be kept in the active force to respond to shorter warning crises, ~~in other regions of the world~~. These heavy divisions would maintain the CS and CSS AC/RC mix as it is today. Therefore, the AC would consist of predominately balanced, light forces, while the RC would assume the Capstone mission for the heavy battle of Central Europe.

The final choice was more a political decision than a military one. "A case can be made that a dollar spent on security assistance buys more security for the United States than a dollar spent anywhere else."⁹ Therefore, four units, specially designed to provide security assistance, are a part of the active force and aligned to separate regions--one unit oriented to the Middle East, another to South/Central America, one to the Pacific Region, and the fourth

to Africa. The type of assistance these units would provide includes "military training, technical training and intelligence and logistical support."¹⁰ These military assistants would augment a civilian counterpart providing medical, engineering, economic, and political assistance. The units would be tailored to meet specific needs of each region. I envision them to be comparable in size ranging from a battalion to a reinforced brigade. For example, the Middle East oriented unit would not need to be as large as the one oriented to the Central/South America.

The resultant structure consists of an active component of the European Corps, the Pacific Corps, the Contingency Corps, consisting of three divisions (one airborne, one air assault, and one light armored), the Reinforcing Corps with three divisions (one heavy armored, one mechanized infantry, and one light armored), and the four security assistance teams. The separate brigades currently in the AC would be paired down similar to the structure resulting from the transition to the AirLand Battle - Future (ALB-F) configuration. There would be four in the AC, all light armor, one for each corps. The reserve component consists of one corps organization, 12 divisions (five armored, six mechanized, and one air assault), and other CS and CSS units not required in the AC as noted above. The 18 separate brigades in the NG would be reduced by three infantry. The remainder would be configured the same as the AC separate brigades of the same type they are today. The USAR would gain 3 brigades, all mechanized infantry.

Concept. The forward deployed forces provide assurance to host nation and alliance organizations of U.S. commitment to those areas. They also assure more rapid integration of mobilized forces to those areas in the event the need arises. The Contingency Corps

forces respond to any emergency under any of the CINC's as needed. If the Contingency forces are not adequate, the Reinforcing Corps supplements. In the event of a sustained operation or major outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the RC forces would be mobilized. The RC units would train to be ready for combat at between M+45 and M+180 depending on their status concerning equipment and priority. GEN Andrew J. Goodpastor, USA(Ret.) stated, "Depending upon changes in the balance of NATO/Warsaw Pact forces, and on the re-posturing of Soviet forces deployed in Europe, and increases in warning time may be possible -- in which case greater reliance can be placed on reserve elements."¹¹

Mobilization would be enhanced through the use of pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS). Given the coalition conditions of the era, CFE agreements, and fiscal constraints, POMCUS would be at levels lower than in 1990.* This points to the need of POMCUS afloat which provides the ability to move the heavier equipment to troubled spots in less time than moving it from the continental United States (CONUS), and avoiding the vulnerability of POMCUS in less-than-sure allied territory.

Deployment is enhanced through the brigade base concept carried over from AirLand Battle - Future. ALB-F calls for more robust brigades with a portion of CS and CSS to allow it to sustain itself for approximately ten days. The divisional headquarters are more tactically oriented with dedicated relationships of certain brigades, but will be supplemented as required with additional brigades of the type needed for the mission. Roundout units from

* "At six division sets in Europe, and taking into account the huge cost of maintaining POMCUS, we should not opt for a higher number of POMCUS units. Fix the RC" [with the excess equipment]. GEN Glen K. Otis, USA(Ret.), Questionnaire response, Jan. 90.

the RC may be used (primarily for the European Corps divisions) but less than was built into the system during the height of the preparation for the worst case scenario.

The AC end strength is low enough that reliance of the AC on the RC built into the Total Army concept of the seventies is maintained. The AC fights all small, short duration conflicts, alleviating the turmoil in the civilian sector caused by periodic recall of the RC. However, either war must be declared or the President must recall a portion of the RC in the event of a larger-scale, or longer duration conflict.

Implications. Even though indicators and warning give us more time to prepare for combat, training remains paramount. Reducing the emphasis on training leads to lower readiness. Lower training standards also create a retention problem which requires more recruiting pressure. All of these degrade readiness, and when readiness is low, more time is required before a unit can enter combat. This in turn necessitates mobilization much sooner, perhaps in peacetime, which the U.S. is reluctant to do.

Therefore, the U.S. must enhance training. With many base closures possible in the nineties, both AC and RC will have fewer training facilities. Small, portable training simulators must be developed to enhance the high-tech skills required in the Army of 2010. Training time should be kept at 39 days per year to alleviate more employer-employee relationship problems. So, to improve training further, regional training centers should be constructed to be used by both active and reserve forces. Leadership training must be stressed with a greater emphasis on AC/RC relationships. GEN Edward C. Meyer, USA(Ret.) maintains that "No USAR or NG officer above the rank of captain in the combat

arms can possibly have enough training to lead American ground forces into the high intensity conflicts of the next decade and the new century."¹²

The personnel strength reduction of the nineties will reduce any "hollowness" that is now present if we do not keep too many divisional flags. LTG Temple believes "reduction means improvement. The ARNG has some 'soft' units that would be 'hardened' by consolidation and gaining equipment from the active forces."¹³ Even though the pool of 18 to 25 year olds will decreased, the reduced demand by the AC and a proactive public relations program will overcome the problem. Besides, the strength of the RC proposed for 2010 is slightly lower than the 1990 level.

Equipping the reserve force should continue to be a high priority item for both the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR) and the National Guard Bureau. Lean budget years may preclude continued modernizing until after the turn of the century. The RC should be upgraded with modern high-tech weaponry as it becomes available in conjunction with the Total Army concept on a priority basis.

The Total Army must continue into the coming years as a viable element of U.S. national security strategy. To neglect the Army, and particular the RC, because the Soviet threat seems to be going away and because of austere budget years, is mortgaging the future security of the United States.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Problems Uncovered. In this paper I have given a possible force structure for the Total Army of 2010. The scope of the research allowed for the development of the force structure, but further study was needed to specify details of force mix. For example, I propose an active component consisting of not only the combat units, but also the combat support and combat service support units. This force mix best meets the needs of the military strategy, but I do not address the detailed effect this has upon the reserve components. Therefore, more study is called for to determine the extent to which the RC ought to be balanced. A congressionally mandated report regarding force mix decisions due from the Pentagon in September, 1990 would aid in this task.

The inherent problem in long-range planning is determining the future. I have presented several options, but continual scanning of the present situation should be used to update trends noted from the near past. Technological breakthroughs should also be incorporated into the projection of the future. If this does not take place, the unexpected may overtake us in spite of past long-range planning. The process needs to be ongoing.

Conclusions. Based upon the alternative futures which I proposed in Chapter III, I developed the force structure presented in Chapter IV. I propose a Total Army force composed of 500,000 active troops in four corps with 11 divisions, and four separate brigades; and 700,000 reserve forces in one corps, 11 divisions, and 16 separate brigades. This force structure supports the following strategy to protect U.S. global interests:

1. Deter major landwar as well as smaller conflicts threatening our global national interests,
2. Provide sufficient active forces with maximum conventional lethality to defeat a smaller force in short warning situations if political, economic and military deterrence should fail,
3. Provide reserve forces with modern weaponry, able to respond within the anticipated warning time to meet the threat of a larger, heavier land force or a conflict that becomes protracted, and
4. Provide military and paramilitary forces to aid nation building efforts in support of U.S. global national interests.

The security environment allows the United States to reduce the size of its Army. The AC reduction can be greater than that of the RC. While the worst case scenario of a major land war in Central Europe with little or no warning is less probable today than at any time in the last 45 years, the potential instability has not gone away. European stability is enhanced by the presence of U.S. forces, even small in number, and RC readiness. A greater responsibility to meet that threat can be transferred to the RC. Increased warning time provided by improved technology, greater distance of Soviet forces from the Inner German Boarder, and the strategic defensive posture of Soviet forces allows the RC to assume this mission.

Recommendations. Based upon this research, I make the following recommendations for the continued ability of the Total Army to meet U.S. National Security needs:

1. Maintain a small contingent of forward deployed forces in Europe, Japan and Korea to enhance regional stability,
2. Maintain a mix of active light and armored forces in CONUS to respond to immediate global contingency problems,
3. Develop a nation building force of military and paramilitary personnel to aid requesting nations,
4. Continue research and development of high tech weaponry,
5. Continue development and procurement of high quality training simulation devices,
6. Develop regional training sites available for use by both the AC and RC,
7. Enhance interoperability through procurement of modern equipment for both the AC and the RC,
8. Continue to stress joint AC and RC training,
9. Balance active units with required CS and CSS forces,
10. Restructure the National Guard and Reserve configuration to accomplish recommendation number 9,
11. Continue CAPSTONE to enhance training, but it should be realigned to reflect the changing mission responsibility of the RC, and
12. Reduce, if not terminate, the Roundout Program.

Conclusion. The state militias have been an integral element of U.S. defense since the country's birth. The ARNG and USAR are now an important part of the Total Army. The future of either cannot be planned without looking at the future of the whole. Thus

the purpose of this paper has been to present the force structure of the Total Army in order to determine that of the RC. With adequate long-range planning the Army will continue robustly, with the proper AC/RC mix, as a respected element of U.S. defense.

APPENDIX I

REVIEW OF MILITARY LONG-RANGE PLANNING

Introduction. I reviewed the military services methodology for long-range planning in an attempt to learn what had been done in the way of exploring the future security environments. In this Appendix I present a brief history of long-range planning in the services and include a synopsis of the alternative futures proposed. All the military services use the Defense Guidance and certain documents from the Joint Strategic Planning System as a foundation for their long-range planning.

U.S. Air Force. The Air Force, in spite of being the newest service, probably has the best record for long-range planning. The Department of the Air Force established the Directorate for Long-Range Planning within the Directorate of Plans in 1979. Both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force endorse the effort as cosignatories on the annual Planning Guidance Memorandum (PGM). "Its stated purpose remains to provide Air Staff and major command planners with broad executive guidance and long-term perspectives to initiate the planning cycle. The document sets priorities for Air Force long-term (15 to 20 years) planning objectives which support national security objectives."¹ Major commands use this guidance for their individual long-range planning. Many commands have a dedicated long-range planning staff to formulate views of the future from which to plan. Their now institutionalized program directly influences the Program Objective Memorandum decision process.

The Air Force uses the alternative futures approach to aid long-range planning. In April of 1989 the Rand Corporation completed the Working Draft of the study entitled Alternative Global Security Environments: Circa 2010. The study presents "four future geo-strategic/economic environments for the 2010 time frame. Each future environment usefully describes a broad spectrum of plausible military threats and requirements as well as the relevant national security strategies that the United States might have at that time."² The four cases envision a multipolar environment including the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan, China, and other powers of the Eurasian Rimland. Factors driving the environments include:

1. global economic performance,
2. uncertainty of USSR evolution,
3. space as the fourth dimension of warfare,
4. rising danger of the Greater Middle East, and
5. nuclear weapon trends.

The four cases result from the possibility of either Russia turning inward or aggressive, combined with the US and the Rimland being either "robust" or "weakened." The cases are summarized in the Executive Summary and I quote them here:

"The Baseline. The Soviet Union will have turned inward after the Gorbachev reforms have bogged down. All major states of the Eurasian rimland, including Western Europe, China, and Japan will have experienced continued economic growth and maintain significant military forces equipped with modern weapons. The United States will have experienced continued economic growth without a major disruption and be able to maintain very modern smaller active military forces.

"Rise of Russian Fascism. Arising from the political disorder and economic disappointment of the Gorbachev era, a new Russian fascist regime will have seized power to save the "socialist" revolution and the Soviet Empire. The Eurasian rimland

states' economic performance will be similar to that experienced in the Baseline with sustained development. In turn, the United States will have suffered no serious economic setback during the two decades of this projection.

"World in Disarray. The Soviet Union will have turned inward for reasons similar to those described in the Baseline. Unlike the Baseline, all of the major Eurasian Rimland States including the United States will have suffered a period of serious economic instability, a severe recession if not depression will have unfolded during the 1990's. All major players will be economically less powerful than in the Baseline, and the postwar political military alliance structure created by the United States will be in disarray.

"The New Cold War. As in the second case, a counter reform regime has seized power in the Soviet Union following the socio-economic failures of the Gorbachev era. Soviet militarism will have been encouraged by the appearance of highly nationalistic but economically debilitated Eurasian rimland states. Both the major Eurasian states and the United States will have suffered serious economic reverses similar to those described in the third case."³

U.S. Navy. The Navy's long-range planning, though being done as early as 1900, has taken longer to institutionalize. From 1977 to 1980 several individual study groups recommend that the Navy establish a dedicated long-range planning group. The effort finally culminated with the Navy forming Long-Range Planning Group (OP-OOX) in June of 1980. The group's activities resembled those of a special staff for the CNO more than those of a long-range planning organization. Therefore, the group was disbanded two years later. For the next several years long-range planning became piecemeal with no central directorate to focus the effort. Recently, Navy efforts at long-range planning have experienced a rejuvenation. Currently, the CNO Executive Panel Task Force attempts to focus Navy long-range planning.

In October of 1989, the CNO Executive Panel Task Force released its final report on Alternative Futures for the Soviet Union. As the title implies, the document focuses entirely

on the Soviet Union. The Task Force concentrated its analysis on the Soviet motives and the US Navy's response. Russia's primary purpose for any arms/force reductions was seen as a ploy to gain "breathing room" to correct seven decades of error. The report concluded that because of the maritime nature of the U.S., it "cannot agree to any arms limitations or additional constraints on its naval activities." It further stated that even if near future events result in ground force reductions, "these ground force proposals should in no way have any bearing on naval force structure."⁴ Because the proposed futures are oriented only toward the Soviet Union, I will not summarize them here.

In January of 1990 the Hon. Thomas H. Etzold completed a paper supported by the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Advanced Concepts Department (US Naval War College, Newport, RI), and the Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren, VA). The paper, Strategy in the 21st Century: Alternative Futures for Strategic Planners, explores the complexity of the world situation in the years 2000 and 2010. In doing so, Mr. Etzold describes, after much research and extrapolating, what many countries' economic and military posture may be in the respective years. After doing so, he summarizes the possible interrelationships in four different alternative futures, or strategic environments. They are (1) bipolar competitive, multilateral competitive; (2) bipolar competitive, multilateral cooperative; (3) bipolar cooperative, multilateral competitive; and (4) bipolar cooperative, multilateral cooperative. His discussion included the U.S., USSR, East and West Europe, Japan, China, Korea, Eastern Mediterranean region, Central and South America, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, and the Persian Gulf states. His synopsis of the four environments follows:

"A bipolar cooperative, multipolar cooperative world would be one in which the US and USSR subordinated especially, though not exclusively, the military aspects of their

competition and sought to cooperate on varying extents on regional, multinational, and international issues, and on crisis avoidance and/or suppression. Such a condition could in turn contribute to circumstances favoring orderly development, cooperative problem-solving, and effective international institutions involving a broad range of nations and concerns.

A bipolar cooperative, multipolar competitive world would likely be one in which the superpowers managed their strategic relationship cooperatively, especially in matters such as arms negotiations and reductions and the channeling of forces for change in critical areas of interest such as Europe. However, it would also be one in which many other states of the world would contend for regional advantage or leadership, resources, influence in international institutions, access to aid, preferential treatment from one or both superpowers, and degrees of technological and economic superiority as compared with either neighboring states or states in other regions having capabilities and aspirations similar to their own.

A bipolar competitive, multipolar cooperative world would considerably resemble the complexities and many shifts in relative advantage and/or opportunity of the traditional Cold War years. The risks of the strategic rivalry between the superpowers would extend to all--allies, neutrals, nonaligned nations, and those distant from and largely indifferent to the interests of the superpowers and the traditional rivalries of the northern hemisphere states. While the superpowers might exploit third states, seek advantage in crisis and intervention, and hold each other and their respective allies at military risk, they would also be subject to manipulation and pressure from other states seeking either to profit from the antagonism between the superpowers or to turn their energies and attentions to an agenda promising more general security, prosperity, and social/political progress for the majority of the world's nations.

A bipolar competitive, multipolar competitive world would seem much like the most rigid periods of the Cold War, in which superpowers, their allies, and many other states shared 'zero-sum' strategic perspectives, accepted (and sometimes promoted) regional conflict and instability as the norm, and competed for resources by whatever means possible, all with a pervasive sense of insecurity and pessimism."⁵

Though he uses the term "alternative futures" in the title of his work, Mr. Etzold actually combines two approaches to long-range planning. In the Snapshot sections of the paper he writes prospective history discussing conditions of the various countries and alliances. Then the alternative futures become the possible interrelations as mentioned above.

It must be recognized that Mr. Etzold's research efforts are being used by study groups sponsored by the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, such as the

Surface Warfare 2030 Symposium; however, it is not part of the official long-range planning process of the Department of the Navy. This is indicative of the non-centralized long-range planning in the Department of the Navy.

U.S. Marine Corps. A small section of long-range planners in the Marine Corps develop the Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP) as part of a five year cycle. The MLRP is compiled over four years following the publishing of the Marine Corps Long-Range Study (MLRS). An independent, outside group develops the MLRS to present a single scenario forecast of the future 20 years out. "The MLRP describes the basis for future operations, as presented in the MLRS, and gives an expected methodology for carrying out those operations."⁶ The single scenario option will not be reviewed here as I was unable to obtain a copy.

U.S. Army. The Army's efforts at long-range planning are compiled in the Army Long-Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG). Starting with the national security objectives, "the ALRPG considers current trends, the forecast developments in technology, and other factors (the impact of political-military, economic and social influences) that are expected to influence the Army in the long term. While considering these many influencing factors, the ALRPG focuses on the need to direct disciplined change in the Army in response to these factors, rather than on the careful recapitulation of every instance of change that is anticipated in the future security environment."⁷ The ALRPG parallels the Air Force Planning Guidance Memorandum and is likewise signed by both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army .

Like the other services, the Army also uses outside organizations to assist in the long-range planning. Some of these organizations are the Strategic Studies Center of the Army War College, the Army Concepts Analysis Agency, the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Army Combat Development Commands, and the Arroyo Center under the administration of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA.

The ALRPG does not use the alternative futures approach. The document identifies major trends and describes them in relation to the threat to U.S. interests and an Army response. Trends expounded upon in the current ALRPG include:

1. Evolution of Soviet Power - both improved ability and projection,
2. Growth of Strategic and Theater Defense Capabilities - the effect of space technology and arms control in the Army,
3. Expansion of Low-Intensity Conflict - possible threat at home as well as abroad and specifically potential Cuban threats during unstable periods,
4. Increasing World-wide Military Capabilities - regional conflicts becoming the norm, trouble spots include Middle East/North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central America, and the rise of military hardware exporters around the world, and
5. Changes in NATO and other Alliances - the expectation for NATO to continue robustly "as long as Germany remains linked . . . and the U.S. remains committed to forward defense in pursuit of its own national interests."⁸

The ALRPG identifies ten "other influencing factors" but does not discuss varying possibilities of future happenings. Future force structure needs and implications are then projected based upon common requirements derived from the various influences. Due to the

date of this current ALRPG (1988), the revolutionary events which occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989 are not reflected. Therefore, any repercussions of these events do not factor into the trends of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact: i.e., greater force reductions in Europe, increased warning time before any attack, and lack of Warsaw Pact military cooperation with Russia.

Army National Guard. The Army National Guard (ARNG) began holding planning workshops to develop values, purpose and missions of the ARNG and evaluate various alternative futures in 1987. The ARNG Long-Range Planning Guidance incorporates input from these workshops as well as input from every level of the Army Directorate of the National Guard Bureau. The final document reflects both the federal and state missions of the ARNG and includes desirable goals. Decision-makers are to "align near and mid-range objectives, programs and tasks with these long-range goals in order to focus the organization on the future."⁹ The office of Plans, Analysis, and Evaluation produces the document and was established by the National Guard Bureau in 1984.

The current ARNG-ALRPG reiterates the major trends identified in the ALRPG. It then goes on to identify significant trends which may affect the ability to accomplish the state mission. The document then presents future scenarios building "the bounds of the potential future environment for which [the planner] must plan and to identify critical branching points along those paths which he must monitor."¹⁰ This section includes a baseline future scenario and four additional alternative futures. The latter four are taken from Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning by Charles W. Taylor of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. I summarize them as follows:

Baseline Scenario 2008. The US finds itself in a world environment that is much more economically interdependent. Its economic position has declined from 1988 levels. The USSR has focused inward on its economy but remains the principal U.S. threat. Its military forces are large and well equipped with modern weaponry and it continues to export its ideology to third world countries. China, Japan, and Brazil play increasingly more important roles. Increased demand for resources has caused an increase in terrorism and low intensity conflict. Budgetary constraints have forced US forces to reduced size, but it maintains its alliance commitments. Its reserve forces have grown to compensate.

Scenario Alpha. Like the Baseline Scenario, the world economy is competitive but good. The U.S. has had a gradual rise in its economy and has turned its attention to domestic issues and its reliance on nuclear deterrence. The Active Army has been reduced to half of 1988 levels with the RC remaining the same as 1988. The AC is fully modernized and highly mobile. The RC has a mix of modern, high tech, and obsolete equipment. Russia has turned inward to improve its economy yet has been able to maintain significant military power. Third World countries have inherited heavy industry and raised conventional weapon armies. Some have nuclear arsenals. Western Europe has 65% fewer U.S. troops present and is wooing its Eastern neighbors into the European Common Market.

Scenario Bravo. Heavy industry has moved to Third World nations while the U.S. and others have become high technology specialists. All countries have increased their military and tensions are high. The Soviets have increased military space activity. The U.S. is able to react to any threat across the spectrum and is prepared to become more heavily involved than ever before in its history.

Scenario Charlie. Industrialization has migrated to Third World countries and they have armed themselves conventionally while nationalizing foreign business. The nuclear club has grown. NATO has deteriorated. The USSR has been concentrating on internal matters but maintains a conventional capability. The U.S. is a healthily postindustrial nation. The Active Army has been reduced by more than half but modernized totally. The RC has been expanded to over one million with increased readiness. **Scenario Delta.** The U.S. economic condition is much the same as in Charlie with the exception that it enjoys world-wide economic and military influence because of its leadership. Third World countries are industrialized but have not nationalized foreign business. The interests of Soviet Union are at home and are not considered a threat to Western Europe. The U.S. remains the primary deterrent force of NATO. The U.S. military relies more on conventional forces than nuclear, with the AC at 1988 levels and the RC manned at over 1.2 million. The AC has been 75% modernized. The U.S. is obviously the world leader.

These alternative futures provide for the slower evolution of what is taking place now in the Soviet Union. Japan, China, and other potentially key nations, though mentioned in the baseline scenario, do not play a major role. Conflicts are not discussed, and the world continues to be bipolar. Finally, the major governmental changes taking place in Eastern Europe are not mentioned because this study was done in 1988. I do not believe anybody postulated the possibility of communism losing power in Eastern Europe nor that the USSR would not have resisted it to a greater degree. Therefore, the ALRPG continued to focus on containment and a Central European Warsaw Pact threat.

U.S. Army Reserve. The Army Reserve is the newest component to institutionalize long-range planning. The Chief Army Reserve (CAR) established the office of Program Analysis and Evaluation since July of 1988, when their first Long-Range Plan was published. The Army Reserve Long-Range Plan uses identical methodology as that prescribed in the Army Long-Range Planning Guidance. Some of their planning assumptions include: a multipolar world, coalition warfare remains central to US strategy, a diminished Warsaw Pact threat, reserve forces less expensive than active, and US population migration causing misalignment of reserve facilities and available manpower. The plan will not be discussed further here because of the similarity to the ALRPG.

Conclusion. It is my hope that the review of the long-range planning being done by the services will promote continued, diligent planning done with a strategic foundation.

APPENDIX II

QUESTIONNAIRE

I solicited responses from 12 retired generals and 1 high government official. The generals had attained either three or four star rank and the official was a former Secretary of the Army. Seven retired officers responded. Of those responding, five answered the following questions. The purpose of the questionnaire was to gain insight from former officers who had been in a position to experience the effects of the Total Army Concept on the readiness of the Army as a whole. The responses helped me determine changes that could be made to improve the role of the RC and thus, the Total Army.

In this appendix you will find the Questionnaire in its entirety. In the response space for each question, I have put the number of responses corresponding to that item.

ATTRIBUTION:

You may/may not (circle one) quote my comments below.

I do/do not (circle one) want a copy of the finished work.

ASSUMPTIONS:

1. Budgetary constraints will continue to force a reduction in Active Army personnel strength.
2. Army forces in Europe will be reduced by CFE agreements and a reduced Warsaw Pact threat.
3. Indicators and warning will increase time to prepare for war in Europe.

QUESTIONS:

1. To what extent do you feel the USAR and the ARNG are able to meet their commitments?

	USAR	ARNG
(1) Very capable.	1	1
(2) Marginally capable.	1	2
(3) Capable with certain improvements.	2	2
(4) Incapable.	2	1

Other/Comments:

2. Do the Roundout and Capstone programs sufficiently meet the total Army needs?

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| (1) Yes, as they currently exist. | 0 |
| (2) Yes, with minor modification. | 3 |
| (3) No, they need major revision. | 2 |
| (4) No, they never have. | 1 |

Other/Comments:

3. Can the National Guard and Reserves assume a greater responsibility for our nation's defense, particularly that of the heavy forces in Europe?

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) Yes, only with personnel increases. | 1 |
| (2) Yes, at present strength. | 0 |
| (3) Yes, even at reduced strength. | 0 |
| (4) No, they are saturated now. | 3 |

Other/Comments:

4. Should the AC be as dependant as they are upon the RC to fight a sustained war?

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) Yes, it's needed to guarantee public support. | 5 |
| (2) No. | 0 |

Other/Comments:

5. If Low Intensity Conflict is what we should be prepared for, should the combat, combat support, and combat service support units be reapportioned to achieve more balance throughout the total Army?

- | | |
|--|---|
| (1) No, they should remain the same. | 0 |
| (2) Shift some CS and CSS to the AC. | 5 |
| (3) Yes, totally balance C, CS, and CSS. | 0 |

Other/Comments:

6. If reductions in the AC result in deactivation of entire units, how should the equipment be redistributed?

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) To POMCUS. | 0 |
| (2) To RC units to improve their readiness. | 5 |
| (3) Sell to Allies. | 0 |
| (4) Some combination of the above. | 0 |

Other/Comments:

7. There are certainly other issues raised by these questions. Some that come to mind concern strategic lift, RC training time, equipment on hand, readiness standards, morale, etc. Please comment on any of these, or others, to complete your thoughts.

COMMENTS

1. "Some of the planned commitment dates are unrealistically early. Also, early commitment would not allow the period of shakedown, training, and strengthening of leadership that would be needed for effectiveness." GEN A. J. Goodpastor, U.S. Army (Ret.)

"USAR - Combat Support and Combat Service Support forces are quite capable of meeting the challenges of the rest of the century with minor improvements.

"NG & USAR - Combat units are and will be unable to meet their wartime requirements unless there is a 6 month assured mobilization time - or a change in the nature of leadership in such units (i.e. active components leadership for federal missions)." GEN E. C. Meyer, U.S. Army (Ret.)

"In both components some units are better prepared ('ready') than others. For the most part, this is by design, because our operations plans and availability of strategic lift do not require that all units be at the same levels of preparedness." GEN G. K. Otis, U.S. Army (Ret.)

"USAR and ARNG combat units particularly at battalion and brigade level generally are well trained, have low turnover of personnel, and are able to achieve reasonably high levels of readiness. This is highlighted by scheduled participation at the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Chaffee, and by overseas exercises such as Team Spirit and Reforger. More AGR personnel are needed and continued modernization is required." GEN J. A. Wickham, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.)

2. "Again, CS & CSS units are more ready than Combat."

"(Under current training restrictions) No USAR or NG officer above the rank of captain in the combat arms can possibly have enough training to lead American ground forces into the high intensity conflicts of the next decade and the new century. Such warfare will be so intense that a full time professional at the art of war will be required to lead/train the combat units." Meyer

"Roundout has been over extended as a concept. Some roundout is viable, but it has been carried too far in the effort to keep 18 active division flags." Otis

"Closer affiliation and exercising with active units continue to be essential for high readiness and interoperability. Wickham

3. "Depending upon changes in the balance of NATO/Warsaw Pact Forces, and on the re-posturing of Soviet forces, substantial reductions in U.S. forces deployed in Europe, and

increases in warning time may be possible -- in which case greater reliance can be placed on reserve elements." Goodpastor

"Yes - If they are augmented in the combat maneuver forces with a cadre of active component officers and NCO's.

- A test should be run to determine the best mix.
- Politically we must address the NG/State/Federal conundrum." Meyer

"Personnel increases are needed to fill CSS units in particular. If CFE leads to demobilization of Active units, RC units should be designated (activated) to round out Active units. Increased AGR strength is essential to achieving high levels of readiness especially with high technology units such as helicopter, and telecommunications-type units." Wickham

4. - "A limited sized force (1 or 2 divisions in the U.S.) should be balanced and ready active duty forces.

- For anything beyond this, it is appropriate to condition our commitment on call up of reserve elements." Goodpastor

"There is no way the active component could be large enough or mobilize quickly enough to sustain a large war. The RC is the insurance policy that must be updated to respond to the changed risk." Meyer

"However, the mix of active vs. reserve component units has been skewed too much in combat service support." Otis

"Reliance on RC is historic, constitutional, and essential for a free nation which seeks to minimize standing armies and their effects." Wickham

5. "Don't accept premise. All conflict is intense - We need continued balance, NOT a repeat of pre-Vietnam gimmickry (then Special forces - now light, low intensity Army CONUS based). Forward deployed active & reserves have economic and political roles as well. For heaven's sake, don't join the gimmick club in the emerging struggle between the services for scarce funds. As cuts are mandated, we will continue to need a balanced active structure with adequate armor, fire power and sustaining capability. Let's not repeat historic errors of the early 60's. GEN A. M. Haig, Jr. U.S. Army (Ret.)

"Ensure that there are adequate CS & CSS in Active Component. No one knows whether we have adequate CS & CSS because we have no clear model for LIC. When we agree on doctrine for LIC ensure that we can support with active - unless the Congress is willing to see CS & CSS RC units called up regularly for such operations. Requires understanding of Administration and Congress of the risk/cost!" Meyer

"Fine training will be required. Some balance is essential if Active units are to be ready for rapid deployment and combat. However, CSS units in particular should be heavily

dependent on RC. This is so because CSS skills generally are available in civil sector and RC units thus could maintain higher readiness/training than AC units. Ammunition handling units illustrate the case. Stevedore or materials handling personnel are in the civil sector, but Active units in peacetime may lack training requirements to keep units at high levels of readiness." Wickham

6. "While adhering to any limits set through arms-control negotiations, any assets freed up should be used to fill out POMCUS, then fill up reserve elements." Goodpastor

1. "We may not be permitted to POMCUS equipment by terms of CFE agreements.
2. We may find it better to give than to sell to allies.
3. If RC units are to be our insurance policy - they must have up to date/modern equipment." Meyer

"At 6 division sets in Europe and taking into account the huge cost of maintaining POMCUS, we should not opt for a higher number of POMCUS units. Fix the RC." Otis

"This will depend in part on CFE negotiations. Some equipment will have to be removed from Europe and destroyed. Depending on strategic commitments and NATO strategy, some equipment might be retained in something akin to POMCUS or war reserve stocks. Other equipment could become FMS or redistributed to AC and RC units." Wickham

7. Other Comments

- "As warning time increases and our forward deployed forces are reduced, fast Sealift becomes more essential than ever. If we won't fund fast Sealift, then we must come to some agreement with allies to provide all heavy forces and we provide lighter more mobile Army forces.

-Politically the role of RC must be analyzed.

- a. Governors involvement.
- b. Acceptance of some AC leadership to upgrade readiness.
- c. Need test of NG divisions and USAR division to determine how this relationship might work.
- d. Must not stop upward mobility (promotions) of USAR & NG officers/NCO's by introduction of Active Component (model 4th MAR DIV).
- e. Readiness standards should be different for active & reserve - If there is 45 days mobilization expected, then units should be trained up to that level - understanding that in the event of war, 45 days exist." Meyer

"The concept of using RC elements in a total Army context is both correct and viable. And, where we have assigned high priority to selected RC units, they have responded with success. However, with the diminishing pool of eligible age people in this decade, it is not practical to expect the RC to recruit toward a much higher personnel strength than they are

currently authorized; which, by the way, is a higher strength than the active component." Otis

"Greater reliance on Reserves will call for more Active personnel in Reserve units. The AGR program needs to grow and remain vital. Readiness of RC units will depend more than ever on innovative training through use of simulator technology, telecommunication netting of battle staffs, participation in regional training centers such as the JRTC and NTC, and overseas exercises. It may be valuable to 'second' active personnel to RC units as was done years ago in an effort to raise standards and improve readiness. But AC end strength limitations may preclude this." Wickham

NOTES

Chapter I

1. Bob Foster and Bob Nelson, "Resource Management is Key to Future Success," National Guard, February 1990, p. 12.

Chapter II

1. Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), p. 24.

2. Ibid., pp. 21-36.

3. U.S. General Accounting Office Report to Congress, Reserve Components: Opportunities to Improve National Guard and Reserve Policies and Programs (Washington: Nov. 1988), p. 2.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

5. Questionnaire response from GEN John A. Wickham, Jr., USA(Ret.), January, 1990.

Chapter III

1. Perry M. Smith et al., Creating Strategic Vision: Long-Range Planning for National Security, (Washington: National Defense University Press, p. 43.; Baltasar Jeronimo Graciban y Morales, The Science of Success and the Art of Prudence, trans. Laurence C. Lockley (Santa Clara: University of Santa Clara Press, 1967), p. 45.

2. Ibid. p. 4.

3. Ibid. pp. 7-9

4. Thomas H. Etzold, Strategy in the 21st Century: Prospective Strategic Environments 2010-2050, N00140-87-D-9878-0010 (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1990), p. 15.

5. Arroyo Center Briefing, "Alternative Futures and their Implications for the Army--Phase 1 Update: Force Structure" (Santa Montica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1990), p. 16.

6. Etzold, Strategy in the 21st Century: Alternative Futures for Strategic Planning, Unpublished Research Paper, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Advanced Concepts Department, Newport, RI: 1990, p. 17.

7. National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Long-Range Plannent Guidance, (Washington: 1988), p. 7.

8. Thomas H. Etzold, Strategy in the 21st Century: Alternative Futures, pp. 16-17.

9. National Guard Bureau, pp. 8-9.

10. Ibid., p. 9-10.

11. Smith, et al., p. 43.; Morales, p. 45.

Chapter IV

1. The Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, 1988), p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 1.

3. U.S. Army Dept., The United States Army Posture Statement FY 90/91 (Washington: 1989), p. 3.

4. U.S. Defense Dept., Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1988: The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington: 1989), p. 14.

5. Christopher Lee, The Final Decade: Will We Survive the 1980's? (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981), p. 175.

6. Etzold, Alternative Futures, p. 26.

7. Etzold, Alternative Futures, p. 9-10; Prospective Strategic Environments, p. 2.

8. Questionnaire response from GEN Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA(Ret.), January, 1990.

9. The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988), p. 61.

10. Ibid., p. 16.

11. Questionnaire response from GEN Andrew J. Goodpastor, USA(Ret.), January, 1990.

12. Questionnaire response from GEN Edward C. Meyer, USA-
(Ret.), January, 1990.

13. Interview with LTG Herbert Temple, ARNGUS, Chief
National Guard Bureau, Washington: 14 December 1989.

Appendix I

1. Jerrold P. Allen in Smith et al., p. 38.

2. Peter A. Wilson and W. E. Simons, Alternative Global
Security Environments: Circa 2010, WD-4372-AF (Santa Monica,
CA: The Rand Corporation, 1989), p. iii.

3. Wilson, pp. iii-v.

4. U.S. Navy Dept., Alternative Futures for the Soviet
Union, CNO Executive Panel Task Force, (Washington: 1989), p.
21.

5. Thomas H. Etzold, Strategy in the 21st Century:
Alternative Futures, pp. 26-30.

6. James L. George et al., Review of USN Long-Range Plan-
ning, Research Memorandum 85-69 (Alexandria, VA: Center for
Naval Analyses, 1985), p. 20.

7. U.S. Army Dept., Army Long-Range Planning Guidance
1998-2008 (Washington: 1988), p. 1.

8. U.S. Army Dept., pp. 2-5.

9. National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Long-Range
Planning Guidance (Washington: 1988), p. ii.

10. Ibid. p. 6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barlow, Dennis C. "Command and Control of the United States Army Reserve." Unpublished Student Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1989.
- Bartlett, Henry C. and Holman, Paul G., Jr. "Strategy as a Guide to Force Planning." Naval War College Review, Autumn, 1988, pp. 15-25.
- Baumgartner, Edward M. "The National Guard Today: Changing Roles." Unpublished Student Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1987.
- Binkin, Martin and Kaufmann, William W. U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks. Studies in Defense Policy. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1989.
- Carlucci, Frank C. Annual Report to the Congress. Washington: 1989.
- The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Discriminate Deterrence. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988.
- Drew, Dennis M. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemma and Doctrinal Procedures. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1988.
- Dwinger, Carl-Friedrich. Warning Time and Forward Defence. National Security Series No. 2/84. Kingston, Canada: Centre for International Relations, 1984.
- Etzold, Thomas H. "Strategy in the 21st Century: Alternative Futures for Strategic Planning." Unpublished Research Paper, Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1990.
- _____. "Strategy in the 21st Century: Prospective Strategic Environments 2010-2050." N00140-87-D-9878-0019. Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1990.
- Foster, Bob and Nelson, Bob. "Resource Management is Key to Future success." National Guard, February 1990, pp. 12, 39.
- George, James L. et al. Review of USN Long-Range Planning. Research Memorandum 85-69. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1985.
- Lampo, Steve F. "A Long-Term National Strategy for the Employment of the Guard and Reserve in the Total Force." Unpublished Student Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1986.

- Lee, Christopher. The Final Decade: Will We Survive the 1980's? London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981.
- National Defense University. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1988. AFSC PUB 1. Norfolk, VA: 1988.
- National Guard Bureau. Army National Guard Long-Range Planning Guidance. Washington: 1988.
- Office of the President. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington: The White House, 1988.
- Ritterpusch, David S. "The Army Reserve and U.S. National Defense Strategy." USAWC Military Studies Program Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: May 1989.
- Robins, Mark S. "Overt Preparations for War." Unpublished Student Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1989.
- Setear, John et al. "The Army in a Changing World: The Role of Organizational Vision." WD-4480-A. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1989.
- Smith, Perry M. et al. Creating Strategic Vision: Long-Range Planning for National Security. Washington: National defense University Press, 1987.
- Strategic Studies Institute. "Strategic Implications of the DOD POMCUS Program (STRATCOM), Study Brief." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1980.
- _____. "U.S. Strategy and the Army Reserve Components" (U) (STARC). Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1980.
- Taylor, Charles W. Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1988.
- U.S. Army Dept. Army Focus. Washington: November, 1989.
- _____. A Strategic Force for the 1990's and Beyond. Washington: January, 1990.
- U.S. Defense Dept. Reserve Component Programs, FY 1988: The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Washington: 1989.
- U.S. General Accounting Office. Reserve Components: Opportunities to Improve National Guard and Reserve Policies and Programs. Report to Congress. Washington: 1988.

Reserve Force: DOD Guidance Needed on Assigning Roles to Reserves Under the Total Force Policy. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. Washington: 1989.

U.S. Navy Dept. "Alternative Futures for the Soviet Union." CNO Executive Panel Task Force. Washington: 1989.

Wilson, Peter A. and Simons, W.E. "Alternative Global Security Environments: Circa 2010." WD-4372-AF. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1989.